There is a danger of exaggerating risks, monopolising resources, and attending to short-term goals while neglecting long-term aims.
Funding for the Zika virus response has become a political football in the US Congress, with long delays for an agreement to meet President Obama's request for emergency funding. To mount a response while Congress dithered, funds were redirected from other diseases. Most notably, US$500 million earmarked for Ebola virus disease (EVD; as well as several millions from other diseases such as infl uenza and tuberculosis). The conception for the fund was that not only would it help address the immediate emergency of EVD but it would also help to build global health security; this pledge has been q uietly forgotten.
A $1·1 billion package to tackle Zika virus has now been approved, but there is no sign that the funds for Ebola virus and other diseases will be repaid. Senior Republicans have given assurances that the funds can be replenished in the future should it become necessary. However, given the potential for Ebola virus to persist in immune privileged sites, such as the eye and testes, there is a risk that the disease will fl are up (as has already happened several times). Furthermore, more than 10 000 survivors are dealing with the long-term sequelae of Ebola virus infections, including ocular problems, joint pain, and mental illness, in countries with extremely limited capacity to deal with such issues. Investing in health-care capacity in west Africa would help the people there (which there is a moral case to do) and also protect every nation against future outbreaks by recognising and quelling any future transmission. The suggestion that more funds are not immediately needed is short-sighted and neglectful.
The experience with EVD should serve as a warning for current eff orts to control Zika virus and the deployment of new methods in South America to prevent transmission. Mosquitoes infected with wolbachia, which render the mosquito incapable of transmitting arboviruses, will be released on a large scale in Brazil and Colombia in 2017. If it proves eff ective in large trials, the technique has the potential to prevent millions of cases of disease. But it will take time. Should Zika virus become endemic in the Americas, large swathes of the population may become immune and Zika virus could slip down funding priorities and the wider international agenda. Whether this happens or not, the present attention on Zika virus should be a catalyst to kick-start vector control, and once started, it should be maintained. Aedes aegypti was almost eradicated in the Americas in the 1960s, but political complacency and changing priorities enabled the mosquito to resurge and with it dengue, chikungunya, and now Zika virus have become widespread. A repetition of history should not be permitted. This is not to undermine the importance of quick and eff ective emergency responses. They save lives and contain outbreaks. Concerted eff orts from donors, governments, and researchers can result in remarkable achievements. The accelerated development of promising Ebola virus vaccines in a matter of months is but one example. And the recent announcement by the UK Government of the formation of the UK Public Health Rapid Support Team to respond within 48 h to new outbreaks anywhere in the world is welcome news. Countries with poor health systems and limited capacity for infection control are likely locations for new epidemics, and teams like this can provide assistance in such areas.
We do not know what the next outbreak will be, but we know there will be one, and we must plan accordingly. The Public Health Rapid Support Team is part of that planning, but it is not enough alone. Supporting international development, continuing aid to low-income countries, avoiding complacency as epidemics subside, and sticking by previous commitments are all parts of the solution to limiting regular infectious epidemics. Attending to emergencies without addressing long-term health issues and global health security as a whole is short-sighted, and alone will never succeed in protecting us from devastating new infections. ■ The Lancet Infectious Diseases
